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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code§78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Whether the district court erred in its interpretation of the 
"Residential Lease Purchase Agreement" by concluding that Appellant Hart's 
option to purchase expired at the end of the agreements fixed term and therefore 
prior to Hart's exercise of her option. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's interpretation 
of a written contract for correctness, granting no deference to the court below. 
Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 6, f 21 (Utah 
01/27/2009) 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or 
regulations whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of such central 
importance as to require their inclusion here. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the consolidation of two cases filed almost simultaneously in the 
Second district. The first was an eviction action filed by Plaintiff and Appellee, 
David Richardson (Richardson). The second was an action for specific 
performance and damages filed by Defendant and Appellant, Cathleen Hart 
(Hart). The cases were consolidated under the first case to be filed and thus the 
parties are referred to as plaintiff and defendant as set forth in the title. 
At the heart of the controversy is the issue of whether Hart's option to 
purchase the condominium she was leasing from Richardson expired at the end of 
the twelve month fixed term of the Residential Lease Purchase Agreement and 
before Hart's exercise of the option. At the conclusion of the bench trial The 
district court ruled that the option had expired and ordered Hart to vacate the 
property. This appeal followed. 
Hart preserved this issue throughout her counsel's closing argument. R. at 
222, p. 146-52. 
Other issues were raised by both parties but because the district court ruled 
as a matter of law that the option expired at the end of the fixed term, those issues 
were not reached by the district court and are not raised here. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 15, 2003, Richardson, as the "Landlord/Seller", entered into 
a "Residential Lease Purchase Agreement" with R & B Property Investment, 
Inc., as the "Tenant/Buyer". Shortly thereafter, on February 22, 2003, R & B 
Property Investment, Inc., assigned their interest as Tenant/Buyer to Hart who 
assumed all of the rights and obligations of the Tenant/Buyer under the 
agreement. R. at 187, p. 2. ADD. 1. The agreement was for the lease and sale of 
a condominium Richardson owned at Wolf Creek Resort in Eden, Utah. R. at 
187, p. 2. ADD. 1. 
The agreement provided for an initial fixed term of 12 months, with a 
right to extend the fixed term for an additional 6 months. The agreement 
further provided that following the fixed term, the agreement would become a 
i i 
month to month agreement if the owners accepted rent from the Tenant/Buyer. 
R. at 12-17 and 135-40, f^ 1. ADD. 3. Richardson did accept rent for the entire 
period of Hart's occupancy. R. at 222, p. 31-33. 
Hart fell in arrears on the rent for a period of time and on July 27, 2005, 
well after the expiration of the fixed term, Richardson served Hart with a 3 day 
notice to pay or quit. R. at 188. ADD. 1. Hart paid the full amount demanded in 
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the notice to pay or quit, and on July 29, attempted to exercise her option. R. at 
188 and R. at 222, p. 31-33. ADD. 1. Richardson refused to accept Hart's 
attempted exercise, citing as his reason that the option had expired. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court ruled that "the lease term within the Agreement 
terminated along with the option" at the end of the fixed term of twelve months 
and thus there was no option to exercise when Hart attempted to do so. R. at 
189. ADD. 1. In so ruling, the district court failed to correctly interpret the 
plain meaning of the language of the agreement. The interpretation of an 
unambiguous contract is determined from the plain meaning of the contractual 
language determined with the assistance of applicable rules of construction. 
The plain meaning of the Residential Lease Purchase Agreement at issue here 
is that the lease and the option to purchase were to run concurrently, even after 
the fixed term of the agreement, on a month to month basis. The option had 
not expired prior to Hart's attempt to exercise it. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is determined from 
the plain meaning of the contractual language determined with the 
assistance of applicable rules of construction. 
The Utah Supreme Court has very recently reiterated the well-accepted 
rules of contract interpretation: 
Under well-accepted rules of contract interpretation, we look to the 
language of the contract to determine its meaning and the intent of 
the contracting parties. We also consider each contract provision in 
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all 
and ignoring none. Where the language within the four corners of 
the contract is unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined 
from the plain meaning of the contractual language, and the 
contract may be interpreted as a matter of law. Only if the 
language of the contract is ambiguous will we consider extrinsic 
evidence of the parties1 intent. We have explained that ambiguity 
exists in a contract term or provision if it is capable of more than 
one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies. 
Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 6, f 25 (Utah 
01/27/2009) (footnotes, quotation marks and ellipses omitted). The Court also 
employs various rules of construction in arriving at the plain meaning. Thus, in 
Cafe Rio, the court employed the ejusdem generis rule: 
Additionally, under the well-established rule of construction ejusdem 
generis, we determine the meaning of a general contractual term based on 
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the specific enumerations that surround that term. 
Id 
Another such rule that is helpful in interpreting the agreement in the 
instant matter is the maxim that the law abhors forfeitures. In Miller Family 
Real Estate, LLC v. Hajizadeh, 200 P.3d 213, 2008 UT App 475 (Utah App. 
2008), this court explained the application of the rule as follows: 
Hajizadeh argues that Miller Familyfs failure to comply with the ADR 
provisions of the REPC renders the entire agreement unenforceable. 
However, such a result would be contrary to general rules of contract 
construction, which favor interpretations that avoid forfeiture. *fn5 See 
Commercial Inv. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 (Utah 1997) 
(ff [Although parties are free to contractually provide for... an enforceable 
forfeiture provision, forfeitures are not favored in the law." (omission in 
original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 
Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 (Utah 1983) ("The undesirability of 
[forfeiture] is well-stated by the maxim that the law abhors forfeiture." 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); accord Crescent Corp. v. Procter & 
Gamble Co., 898 F.2d 581, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying the rule 
against forfeitures in the context of an arbitration provision with express 
time limits). Consequently, courts are reluctant to interpret each 
promissory provision of a contract as conditional. See 5 Margaret N. 
Kniffin, Corbin on Contracts § 24.22, at 244-45 (rev. ed. 1998) ("When 
two interpretations are possible and one would produce an express 
condition and the other a different interpretation that will not result in 
forfeiture or a penalty, the court will usually choose the latter."). 
Id. f 7. Hart urged the district court to consider this rule in interpreting the 
Residential Lease Purchase Agreement, (R. at 222, p. 152), but there is no 
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indication that the district court considered the rule. See R. at 222, p. 161-165, 
and R. at 187-192. ADD. 1. 
II. The District Court erred in its interpretation of the lease purchase 
agreement. 
The district court concluded that according to the unambiguous 
contractual language, the option to purchase expired one year from the effective 
date of the contract. R. at 189. ADD. 1. Accordingly, the court concluded that 
Hart's attempt to exercise the option more than a year beyond the effective date 
was ineffectual. Id. The court did not do a clause-by-clause analysis to explain 
its rationale; rather the court seems to have treated the agreement as a traditional 
lease with a separate option to purchase. The court cited Coombs v. Ouzounicm, 
465 P.2d 356 (Utah 1970), for the proposition that an option must be exercised 
in accordance with its terms. R. at 189. ADD. 1. The option at issue in Coombs, 
however, was an independent option agreement. Coombs, supra, at 356. 
Coombs does not support the district court's interpretation of the agreement at 
issue here. 
The agreement entered into by the parties, as will more fully be explored 
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below, was not a traditional lease containing an option to purchase clause. 
Rather, it was a very poorly designed instrument to facilitate the eventual 
purchase of a rental property by a tenant that might not otherwise qualify for 
conventional financing; a "rent-to-own" agreement, if you will. The court 
should have interpreted the document as an integrated agreement in which the 
term of the lease and the term of the option to purchase ran simultaneously, 
including during the month to month tenancy. 
III. The correct interpretation of the agreement is one which results 
in the option provisions surviving beyond the fixed term of the agreement. 
A review of various aspects of the agreement demonstrate that the correct 
interpretation of the agreement is the one proffered by Hart, and not the one 
arrived at by the district court. 
1. The title of the agreement is "RESIDENTIAL LEASE PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT", (emphasis added) not "Residential Lease Option Agreement", 
nor "Residential Lease with Option to Purchase Agreement". R. 12-17 and 135-
40. This title is set out in large bold print on the top of each page of the 
document implying that the document anticipates that the property will in fact 
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ultimately be purchased by the Tenant/Buyer prior to the termination of the 
agreement. The district court's interpretation of the agreement is not bolstered 
by the prominent title appearing on every page of the agreement. The 
interpretation proffered by Hart is consistent with the title and its placement. 
2. The parties are variously referred to as "Landlord/Seller" or 
Seller/Landlord", and "Tenant/Buyer" or "Buyer/Tenant", not 
"Landlord/Optionor" and "Tenant/Optionee". R. at 12-17 and 135-40. ADD. 3. 
This designation implies that the agreement is something different than a 
traditional lease containing a separate option provision and is more consistent 
with Hart's proffered interpretation than that adopted by the district court. 
3. Paragraph 1, after fixing the term of the lease at 12 months, provides 
that "this agreement [not this lease} shall become a month to month agreement 
[not a month to month lease or month to month tenancy] if owners accept rent 
from Tenant/Buyer." The correct interpretation of this provision is crucial. The 
district court concluded that "[t]here is no ambiguity in the Agreement on this 
point". Hart agrees, there is no ambiguity. But then the district court concluded 
that "the lease term within the Agreement terminated along with the option one 
year later". R. at 189. ADD. 1. But that is not what the plain language says. 
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proffered interpretation than the interpretation of the district court. 
7. Paragraph 50 then adds an additional requirement prior to termination 
of the Tenant/Buyer's interest. "In the event of any such default by 
Tenant/Buyer, then in addition to any other remedies available to 
Landlord/seller at law or in equity, Landlord/Seller shall have the option to 
terminate this lease and all rights hereunder by giving written notice of 
intention to terminate" R. at 12-17 and 135-40,]f 50. ADD. 3. (Emphasis 
added). This language evinces an intent that there is to be nothing automatic 
about termination of the agreement. 
All of the provisions referred to are consistent with an interpretation of an 
ongoing lease and option on a month to month basis beyond the initial fixed 
term and any extensions of the fixed term. They are not consistent with the 
district court's interpretation. 
IV. Appellant Hart is entitled to an award of her attorney fees. 
If this court rules that the district court erred in its interpretation of the 
Residential Lease Purchase Agreement, as Hart respectfully submits it should, 
then Hart is entitled to an award of her attorney fees as set out in paragraph 56 
12 
of the agreement. R. at 12-17 and 135-40, % 56. ADD. 3. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's interpretation flies in the face of the plain language of 
the agreement. This result is underscored by application of the maxim that the 
law abhors forfeitures. This court should overturn the district court's decision, 
remand the matter to the district court, and award Hart her attorney fees. 
a DATED this ' f day of April, 2009. 
Frank S. Warner 
Attorney for Appellant 
Cathleen Hart 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I hereby certify that on this day of April, 2009,1 served a copy of 
the foregoing Brief on the attorneys for Appellee by mailing two copies of the 
same by first class mail addressed to Stephen F. Noel at 4723 Harrison Blvd., 
Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84403. 
Frank S. Warner 
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1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Honorable Parley R. Baldwin, 
District Court Judge, entered August 27,2008. R. at 187-192. 
2. Oral ruling of Honorable Parley R. Baldwin. R. at 222, p. 161-165. 
3. Residential Lease Purchase Agreement, dated February 15, 2003. R. at 12-
17 and 135-140. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID RICHARDSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CATHLEEN HART, 
Defendant. 
BINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 050906247 
Under Consolidation with 
Civil No. 050906492 
Judge Parley R. Baldwin 
AUG 
THIS MATTER came before the Court on a bench trial on June 16, 2008. The parties 
and their respective attorneys of record were present. The parties presented their evidence and 
made argument to the Court. The Court took the matter under advisement and issued its ruling 
by way of a telephone conference attended by the parties and their attorneys. Based upon the 
evidence admitted at trial, the argument presented and the law relevant to this matter, the Court 
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
* ft * it*» 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On Februray 15, 2003, Plaintiff entered into a Residential Lease Purchase Agreement 
("Agreement") with R&B Property Investment, Inc. for the lease of a condominium at 
Wolf Creek Resort, Eden, Utah. 
2. On February 22, 2003 the Agreement was assigned to the Defendant, Cathleen Hart. 
3. Pursuant to the assignment, Defendant assumed all the rights and obligations of the 
Agreement. 
4. The Agreement required monthly payments in an amount of $650.00, plus a service 
fee, to be paid on the first of each month. 
5. An account for the payment and receipt of lease payments was set up by R&B 
Property Investment, Inc. with Escrow Specialists, an entity which provides services 
for landlords and renters, as well as sellers and buyers, of property. Among other 
things, it accepts payments, provides an accounting, tracks late fees, sends notices, 
etc. 
6. The Agreement provided for the rental of the subject property, while at the same time 
provided the Defendant with the opportunity or option to purchase the same property 
by providing a written notice to the Plaintiff exercising said option pursuant to the 
terms of the Agreement. 
7. The term of the lease within the Agreement was 12 months, with a right to extend the 
term an additional 6 months if Defendant was "in full compliance with all the terms" 
of the Agreement. 
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8. The Agreement was effective as of February 15, 2003. The subsequent assignment, 
which was entered into between the assignor and the Defendant, and which the 
Plaintiff did not sign, attempted to modify the effective date of the Agreement to 
April 1, 2003. This did not seem to be an issue at trial. Moreover, whichever 
effective date is used, it does not affect the conclusions of this Court as set forth 
below. 
9. The Agreement contained an option to purchase the property "conditioned upon full 
compliance by [Defendant] with all terms of the" of the Agreement. 
10. The property was to be returned to the Plaintiff "at the end of the term of [the] option 
in the event the option [was] not exercised." 
11. The parties expressly agreed pursuant to the Agreement that the option could be 
exercised by Defendant "as long as [the Defendant was] not in default of the terms 
and conditions of [the Agreement]. " 
12. The parties agreed that time would be of the essence in meeting all of the deadlines in 
the Agreement. 
13. On July 27, 2005, Plaintiff served a 3 day notice to pay or quit upon the Defendant. 
14. On July 29, 2005, for the first time since the commencement of the Agreement, 
Defendant attempted to exercise the option by way of a letter to Plaintiff stating that 
she "intends to exercise the Option to Purchase the property..." 
15. There were no written amendments to the Agreement. 
3 
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16. Plaintiff has incurred $14,388.87 in attorney's fees and costs the in the prosecution 
and defense of this matter. This is amount is reasonable. Defendant's counsel 
stipulated to the reasonableness of this amount at trial. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The clear and express terms of the Agreement establish that its term was for 12 months, 
with a right to extend for an additional six months. While it goes without saying that there is no 
option to exercise once it has expired, it has long been the established rule in Utah that an option 
"must be exercised in accordance with its terms." Coombs v. Ouzounian, 465 P.2d 356 (Utah 
1970). There is no ambiguity in the Agreement on this point. Regardless of which effective date 
is used, the lease term within the Agreement terminated along with the option one year later, 
either on February 15 or April 1, 2004. From the evidence presented, it appears the Defendant 
never elected to extend the lease term an additional 6 months as per paragraph 62(4) of the 
Agreement. However, even if she had, the 6 month extension would have expired on October 1, 
2004 at the latest, yet the Defendant did not attempt to exercise the option until July 29, 2005, 
ten months later. Time was of the essence in the performance of the Agreement. As such, the 
Court concludes that there was no option to exercise on July 29, 2005, inasmuch as it had 
expired by that date. 
The Defendant argued that the portions of the Agreement relevant to this dispute had 
been modified by the parties. "An option to purchase is an interest in real estate and is within the 
statute of frauds." Mills v. Brody, 929 P.2d 360, 364 (Ut. App. Ct. 1996). In Brody, one party 
was seeking specific performance of a lease option on a condominium, much like the current 
4 
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case, and argued that the other party orally extended the deadline for payment. Id. at 364. 
However, even in the face of an alleged express, but oral, agreement to modify the deadline in 
the lease, the court upheld the trial court's ruling voiding the oral agreement as violative of the 
statute of frauds. Id. The court ruled that an extension of a contract which is required to be in 
writing is not enforceable "if it does not comply with the statute of frauds." Id. at 364. There is 
no writing in the current case supporting these alleged oral conversations extending the deadlines 
or otherwise forgiving or modifying the terms and obligations of the Agreement. Moreover, 
there was no evidence presented at trial which was alleged to have expressly modified the option 
deadline of the Agreement. There was no oral agreement between the parties extending the term 
of the lease or the option. 
A receipt from Escrow Specialists showing the balance due on the purchase of the 
lease/purchase of the property is an accounting function. The Agreement's primary and initial 
purpose was for the rental of the subject property. While it provided an opportunity or option to 
the Defendant to purchase the property, the right and the obligation to purchase would not ripen 
until the Defendant exercised the option pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. As such, it 
cannot be said that the payment receipts issued by escrow specialists showing the balance due on 
the purchase modified the Agreement such that it obligated the Plaintiff to sell and the Defendant 
to purchase the property from the commencement of the Agreement, thereby converting the 
Agreement to a real estate purchase agreement from the very beginning. This "conversion" 
could not take place without Defendant's proper exercise of the option to purchase pursuant to 
the terms of the Agreement itself. 
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Therefore, the receipts likewise cannot be used as the required memorandum supporting a 
wholesale modification to the Agreement. The Defendant offered English v. Standard Optical 
Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Ut.Ct.App. 1991) in support of her argument on this issue. However, the 
facts are materially different from those of the instant matter. In English the parties disputed the 
renegotiation of the amount of lease payments. The tenant argued that an agreement had been 
reached as to the new amount. The court ruled that the original lease satisfied the "written 
memorandum" requirement of the statute of frauds because the original lease expressly required 
the parties to renegotiate the amount of the lease payments every 36 months. Id. at [^15 and 27. 
Therefore, the parties were only doing verbally what the original lease required them to do in the 
first place. Also, the landlord accepted several checks in the amount of the new lease amount 
from the tenant. In addition, it appears to have been important to the English court that the 
landlord in that case admitted to the oral agreement with the tenant. Id. at ^J's 27 and 34. There 
was no such admission or finding in the current case. 
In fact, the English court recognized that "[i]t is fundamental that the memorandum 
which is relied upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all the essential terms and 
provisions of the contract. . .," and that "writings shall so clearly evidence [the] fact that a 
contract was made and what its terms are that there is no serious possibility that the assertion of 
the contract is false." Id. at | ' s 27 and 34(emphasis added). There is no evidence in this case 
which clearly evidences any modification to the Agreement, much less a written document 
satisfying the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
6 191 
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Because the Defendant failed to timely exercise her option pursuant to the terms of the 
Agreement, Defendant is without a right to purchase the property. The Court finds in favor of 
the Plaintiff and orders the Defendant to vacate the property no later than August 1, 2008. 
Defendant is hereby required to pay rent to the Plaintiff for her occupation of the property 
through August 1,2008 in the amount of $650.00 per month. 
The Agreement requires that the prevailing party to any litigation concerning the 
enforcement of the Agreement shall be entitled to recover all reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred as a result of said litigation. The Court finds that the Plaintiff has prevailed in this 
matter as contemplated by the Agreement and is entitled to recover from the Defendant attorneys 
fees and costs in the amount of $14,388.87. 
Plaintiff is directed to draft and submit a proposed judgment consistent with these 
findings and conclusions. * 
DATED this ^ 27 day of j(kid^^ 2008. 
B]^THECOURT/^ 
^SAJJC 
District Court Judge, 2 District, Ogden 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
C Jhl/ 
FR^NK S. WARNER 
Attorney for Defendant Cathleen Hart 
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THE COURT: -- for purposes of the record, this is the 
matter of the Richardson versus Hart. Ifm in the courtroom. 
This matter is on the record. Representing the parties is 
Frank Warner who represents the defendant in this matter and 
Mr. Noel who is representing the plaintiff. 
This is a case that we took evidence on, I heard the 
case. Following that, each of the parties provided me some 
additional information. I!ve had a chance to review the 
cases that were given to me. In addition to that, the 
additional arguments that have been made. Taking all of that 
into consideration, I'm now prepared to enter a ruling on 
this matter. Is there any reason that we shouldn't go 
forward with that? 
MR. WARNER: I know of none, your Honor. 
MR. NOEL: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: Thank you. In this matter, this case arises 
from a document that is entitled residential lease/purchase 
agreement. This agreement was entered into on February 15th, 
2003, between the plaintiff in this action, David Richardson, 
and R&B Property Investments, Incorporated. This was a 
residential lease/purchase agreement on property located at 
3615 North Wolf Creek Drive, number 211. 
Subsequent and with the document provided that this 
agreement could be assigned within a given period of time. 
Pursuant to that document, there was an assignment of 
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agreement that was entered into on February 23rd, 2003, 
between R&B Properties and the defendant in this case, 
Cathleen Hart. In that agreement, signed by those parties, 
the paragraph 2 provides that the assignees hereby assume all 
of the rights, title, interest, and conditions of the 
attached lease/purchase agreement. 
That contract took effect on April 1st, 2003. Pursuant 
to the residential lease and purchase agreement, an account 
was set up through Escrow Specialists for purposes of 
accounting or payments and those matters. The escrow — I 
assume also placed into escrow were other documents. That 
was set up between the parties and they were the one who did 
the receipt of money and subsequent to that sent out notices 
to each party. 
As I mentioned, I've had a chance — and Ifm not going 
to go through all of the facts in this case as the parties 
pretty well agree on the background and the effects. There 
are some disputes on conversations that took place and some 
other issues. I don!t get to those because I focus -- I have 
focused my attention to the residential lease/purchase 
agreement and the terms and conditions set forth in that 
document. Specifically, in the first paragraph of that 
document, there is an agreement that the lease is for a fixed 
term of 12 months with the following language: Thereafter, 
this agreement shall be become a month-to-month agreement if 
163 
owners accept rent from tenant/buyer. Specifically, at the 
end of the document, there are some additional handwritten 
items in the document. Paragraph 4 of that says, if 
tenant/buyer is in full compliance with all the terms of this 
agreement, they have the right to extend for six months, and 
then some additional language about the assignability of the 
agreement. 
This Court finds that though there may be other 
discussions that were involved, that in fact this 
lease/purchase agreement is the binding document between the 
parties, and that binding document at best extends for a 
period of 18 months the terms and conditions. There is 
language about the default in paragraph 4 9 that says, when 
there is a default, requires certain notice, that the terms 
of the contract will immediately become month to month. 
Nevertheless, this Court finds that the lease agreement 
extended for no longer than that 18 months. I find that it's 
insufficient that there was some writing from Escrow 
Specialists caring for the balance of the — what could have 
been the purchase agreement, but that in itself was 
insufficient writing and by — really by the third party, not 
by either of these parties, for that recital. 
In addition, there is — the Court finds that there is 
no other substantial amendments to this document, 
particularly in writing. Therefore, I find for the plaintiff 
164 
and am requiring the vacation of the property by the 
plaintiff. 
In doing so, let me say that I have been extremely 
concerned about the forfeiture of this woman's home, and I've 
looked at it, but I feel that I'm bound to follow the written 
agreement that was entered into between the parties. 
In addition to that, I have really struggled with the 
provision that in the purchase agreement that talks about the 
awarding of attorney's fees, that paragraph, in particular 
paragraph 56 entitled attorney fees, tells me that if either 
party to this agreement shall bring a cause of action against 
the other party for enforcement of the agreement, the 
prevailing party shall recover reasonable attorney's fees 
involved. With the shall language, I think, again, I am 
bound by the terms of the agreement. As I mentioned earlier, 
I looked at the assignment to see if there was a way where 
through at assignment process that that particular provision 
may or could be lost, and again, in that, the defendant has 
agreed to all of the conditions of the lease/purchase 
contract. Therefore, I find that the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover his attorney's fees as was presented to me at the 
time of trial. 
With that, Mr. Noel, if you'll prepare the appropriate 
findings and judgment, the Court will sign that. 
The property should be vacated no later than August 1st, 
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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you both for the manner in 
which this was prepared and presented to me. 
MR. NOEL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thanks. 
MR. NOEL: Thank you, Judge. 
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This agreement dated O-'S- ^ > o ^ is by and between Landlord / Seller.0**xo &~"tt*S-W and 
Tenant/Buyer, R & B Property Investments Inc. for the dwelling located at: 
3 4 / 5 - K>oiC C(LGe*~ g>o, fr-atl go^AjUT^rt . under the following terms and conditions: 
1. Fixed-Term Agreement : Tenant/Buyer agree to lease this dwelling for a fixed term of 
)^c*\&. Thereafter, this agreement shall become a month to month agreement if owners accept 
rent from Tenant/Buyer. 
2. Rent: Tenant/Buyer agree to rent this dwelling for the sum of S &S& per month payable in 
advance. The first months rent is S £ £ o ^ beginning upon the agreed assignment Rent must be 
received on time in order to receive rent credit There is no grace period. 
3. Form of Payment: Tenant/Buyer agrees to pay rent in the form of personal check, a cashier's check or 
money order to Landlord/Seller. 
4. Rent Payment Procedure: Tenant/Buyer agree to pay their rent to Landlord/Seller at the following 
address: Escrow Specialists, P.O. Box 3287, Ogden, Utah, 84409 
5. Returned Checks: If for any reason a check used by tenants to pay Landlord/Seller is returned without 
having been paid, Tenant/Buyer will pay returned check charge of S20.00 and take whatever other 
consequences there might be in making a late payment After the second time that the tenant's check is 
returned, tenants must thereafter secure a cashier's check or money order for payment of rent 
6. Rent Due Date: The due date for the rent owing under this agreement is the first day of every calendar 
month. The late date is one day later. In other words, Tenant/Buyer must pay the rent on or before the due 
date. The very next day is the rent late date. This is the first day when Landlord/Seller will consider the rent 
late. Landlord/Seller expects to have RECEIVED the rent before this date. If Tenants/Buyer rent is due on 
the first it must be received on or before the first to be on time. There is no grace period 
-7. Late Fees and Penalties: Landlord/Seller expect Tenants/Buyer to pay rent promptly. In the event that 
.this does not occur for any reason, the tenant/buyer will agree to pay a $5.00 per day until full payment is 
-received. In addition, the term of this contract will become a month to month agreement and any option to 
purchase will be revoked. 
~8. Utilities/Services: Tenant/Buyer agree to pay all utilities and services. 
9. Use: The property shall be used and is designated as a residential dwelling. 
10. Occupants: The number of occupants is limited to . Only the following persons may live in this 
• dwelling . No one else may live there without the Landlord/Seller's 
prior written permission. 
.11; Assignment: The original tenant / buyer has the right to assign this Lease Purchase agreement and will 
be^ released from ail liability upon the assignment Any assignment fee/ option consideration received by 
the original tenant / buyer shall be credited to the purchase price. 
12. Pets: Tenant/Buyer may house a pet on the premises with owner's / landlord's written permission. 
»13. Damage: Tenant/Buyer agree to pay for repairs of all damage which they or their guests have caused to 
the dwelling. 
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14 Appliances- rettMretor. dishwasher, clothes washer/dryer, microwave, garbage compactor or disposal, 
'the use of these appliances is not included in the rent If Tenant/Buyers wish to use these appliances, they 
• agree to assume all responsibility for repair and maintenance. 
15. Tenant/Buyer Inspection: Tenant/Buyer have inspected the dwelling and its contents and agree that 
" * they are in satisfactory order, as are the electrical, plumbing and heating systems. 
16 Notification of Serious Building Problems: Tenant/Buyer agree to notify the Landlord/Seller 
immediately upon first discovering any signs of serious building problems such as a crack in the foundation, 
a tilting porch, a crack in the plaster or stucco, moisture in the ceiling, buckling sheetrock or siding, a leaky 
roof; a spongy floor, a leaky water heater or termite activity. 
17. Pest Control: Pest control is the responsibility of the Tenant/Buyer. 
18. Window: Tenant/Buyer agree to be responsible for any windows which become cracked or broken in 
'their dwelling while they live there. 
19. Drain Stoppages: As of the date of this Agreement, Landlord/Seller warrant that the dwelling's sewage 
drains are in good working order and that they will accept the normal household waste for which they were 
designed. They will not accept things such as diapers, sanitary napkins, tampons, children toys, wads of 
toilet paper, balls of hair, grease, oil, table scraps, clothing, rags, sand, dirt, rocks or newspapers. 
Tenant/buyer agree to pay for cleaning the drains of any and all stoppages. 
20. Trash: tenant/Buyer agree to dispose of their ordinary household trash by placing it into a closed 
receptacle for periodic collection. They agree to dispose of their extraordinary household trash by hauling it 
to the dump themselves or by paying someone else to haul it away. 
21. Outside Placement: Landlord/Seller further reserve the right to construct property improvements above 
or below the ground, anywhere on the premises, so long as they conform to all building codes. . 
22. Locks/Lockouts: Tenant/Buyer agree that they will not change the locks on any door or mailbox 
without first obtaining Landlord/sellers' written permission. Having obtained permission, they agree to pay 
for changing the locks themselves and to provide the Landlord/Seller with one duplicate key per lock. 
-Should Tenant/Buyer lock themselves out their dwelling and be unable to gain access through their own 
resources they may call upon a professional locksmith to let them in. In either case, the Tenant/Buyer is 
responsible for payment of the charges and/or damages involved or incurred. 
23. Maintenance/repairs: Tenant/Buyer has inspected the premises and acknowledges that they are in 
-.. satisfactory condition and accepts the premises in "as is" condition as suited for the use intended. 
^ Tenant/Buyer shall be responsible for all repairs, maintenance and damages of this dwelling — A/*r r^ cr-w 
24. Alterations: Decorations and repairs-Tenant/Buyer agree not to alter or decorate their dwelling without 
. first obtaining Owners' /landlords' written permission. 
25. Access: Landlord/Seller recognize that Tenant/Buyer have a right to privacy and wish to observe that 
; right scrupulously. At certain times, however, Owners, their employees, or agents may have to gain access 
to the Tenant/Buyers' dwelling for the purposes of showing it to prospective Tenant/Buyers, purchasers 
lenders or others or for repairs, inspection or maintenance. Landlord/Seller will provide Tenant/Buyer 
reasonable notice of twenty-four (24) hours or less than twenty-four (24) hours with Tenant/Buyers' 
concurrence. In emergencies, there will be no notice. 
26. Peace and Quite: Tenant/Buyer are entitled to the quite enjoyment of their own dwelling, and their 
neighbors are entitled to the same. Tenant/Buyer agree to refrain from making loud noises and disturbances 
InitiaL/l fl~~ 4^ 
6 / 1 7 / 2 8 8 8 I I : 5 5 : ££812i-: 
RESIDENTIAL LEASE PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
and to keep down the volume of their music and broadcast programs at all times so as not to distuib other 
people's peace and quite. 
27. Telephone: If and when Tenant/Buyer install a telephone in their dwelling, they will furnish 
Landlord/Seller with the number within three (3) calendar days. Landlord/Seller agree to take reasonable 
precautions to keep it from falling into the hands of third parties. 
28. Business Use: Tenant/Buyer agree to use this dwelling as their personal residence. They agree to 
conduct no business on the premises without first obtaining Owner/Landlords' written permission. 
29. Lawful Use: Tenant/Buyer agree that they will not themselves engage in any illegal activities on the 
premises nor will they allow others to engage in any illegal activities on the premises insofer as they have 
the power to stop such activities. 
30. Insurance: Owners have obtained insurance to cover fire damage to the building itself and liability 
, insurance to cover certain personal injuries occurring as a result of property defects or Landlord/Seller 
negligence. Owners' insurance does NOT cover Tenant/Buyers' possessions or Tenant/Buyers' negligence. 
Tenant/Buyer shall obtain a Tenant/Buyers' insurance policy to cover damage to or loss of their own 
possessions, as well as losses resulting from their negligence. Tenant/Buyer agree to show Landlord/Seller 
evidence of such policy within (1) month of this Agreement 
.31. Insurance Considerations: tenant/Buyer agree that they will do nothing to the premises nor keep 
anything on the premises which will result in an increase in the Owners* insurance policy or an endangering 
of the premises. Neither will they allow anyone else to do so. 
32. Fire or Casualty Damage: Should fire or casualty damage have been caused by Tenant/Buyer's own 
" action or neglect, they shall NOT be relieved of the responsibility for payment of rent, and they shall also 
bear the fiill responsibility for repair of the damage. 
33. Service of Process: Every Tenant/Buyer who signs this Agreement agrees to be the agent of the other 
• Tenant/Buyer and occupants of this dwelling and is bodi authorized and required to accept, on behalf of the 
other Tenant/Buyer and occupants, service of summons and other notices relative to the tenancy. 
34. Identity of Manager The person who is responsible for managing this dwelling is: 
^ A V te> fcu<wte>^w whose phone number is: 8*1 8 a S ^ Co<£ Q> 
35. Notice of Intention to Vacate: When Tenant/Buyer have decided to vacate the premises, they will give 
•. Landlord / Seller written notice of their intentions at less thirty (30) days prior to their departure, and they 
will give an exact date they expect to be moved out completely. 
36. Holding Over. If TeuantfBuyer remain on the premises followng the date of tiieir termination, they are 
"holding over" and become liable for rental and /or other damages 
37. Option to Purchase: 
Ja) Landlord/Seller grants to Tenant/Buyer, the right to purchase said property conditioned upon foil 
- compliance by Tenant/Buyer with all terms of this Agreement. 
(b) Landlord/SeUer agrees that upon exercise of the option Tenant/Buyer shall be credited at close of 
- escrow with $ _ £ f 2 j f £ _ _ from each monthly rental payment 
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38. Option Consideration: Tenant/Buyer will pay $50.00 as option consideration for the residence known 
This consideration shall be credited at close of escrow toward the sales price. 
This consideration is not refundable. 
SHOULD THE OPTION NOT BE EXERCISED BY THE TENANT/BUYER, THERE WELL BE 
NO REFUND OR CREDIT OF ANY MONTHLY RENTAL PAYMENTS OR OPTION 
CONSIDERATION. 
-39. Price: The purchase price shall be $ ) p o , ? p o at the time the option is exercised less 
option consideration money and monthly rent credit. 
40. Surrender of Property: The tenant/Buyer will surrender and deliver the property at the end of the term 
of this option in the event the option is not exercised. The property should be delivered in good order and 
condition as the same now exists except for reasonable wear and tear. 
41. Exercise of Option: 
(a) The option may be exercised by Tenant/Buyer, as long as Tenant/Buyer is not in default of the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement. 
(b) To exercise the option, Tenant/Buyer should mail a written certified signed receipt of notice to the 
Landlord/Seller. 
42. Encumbrances: 
(a) The parties agree that neither will cause or permit any lien to attach to or exist on or against the subject 
• property which shall or may be superior to the rights of either party or to encumber the property in any 
manner without having obtained the written consent of the other. 
• (b) Prior to the exercise of the option, Landlord/Seller reserves the right to change existing, encumbrances 
on the property through refinance, early payoff of the loan(s), or modification of existing loan(s) so long as 
said change would not create an encumbrance exceeding the agreed upon value of the property, 
> 43. Escrow: Escrow holder shall credit Tenant/Buyer with the option consideration paid and held by 
. Landlord/Seller during the option period and any monthly credit as described by the above toward the 
.purchase of the above property only. 
44. Closing Costs: 
% (a) Real property taxes on the property and the general and special assessments if any, for the current fiscal 
year shall be prorated to the close of the escrow and paid by the Landlord/Seller. 
.* (b) The "closing costs" shall be those costs incurred in conjunction with closing escrow and shall be paid at 
• the close of escrow as follows: 
^(l) Tenant/Buyer to pay reasonable, normal buyer's closing costs.. 
. 45. Repair and Condition of Property during Lease period: Tenant/Buyer accept the premises as being 
in good condition and repair and shall keep this dwelling in good and satisfactory repair and condition 
during the term of this lease. 
'46. Time: Time is of the essence in this Lease Purchase Agreement 
47. Indemnification: Landlord/Seller shall not be liable for any damage or injury to Tenant/buyer or any 
other person or to any property, occurring on the premises, or any part thereof, or in common areas thereof 
unless such damage is the approximate result of the negligence or unlawful act of Landlord/Seller. Buyer 
and Seller shall further indemnify and hold the preparer of this contract harmless from any and all claims 
arising from this transaction. 
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-48. CC&Rs: Acknowledges receipt of all pertinent rules and regulations and CC&Rs. concerning this 
property, 
49. Default: The occurrence of the following shall constitute a material default and breach of Contract by 
Tenant/Buyer. Anyfeilure by Tenant/buyer to pay rent on time or perform any provisions of this lease to be 
performed by Tenant/Buyer where such a failure continues thirty (30) days after written notice thereof by 
Landlord/Seller will constitute a material breach of this contract and forfeit the option to purchase. In 
addition, die term of this contract will immediately become month to month. 
50. Event of Default; In the event of any such defeult by Tenant/Buyer, then In addition to any other 
remedies available to Landlord/seUer at law or in equity, Undlord/Seller shall have the option to terminate 
this lease and all rights hereunder by giving written notice of intention to terminate. 
51. Possession; Landlord/Seller shall endeavor to deliver possession to Tenant/buyer by the commencement 
date of this Agreement 
-52. Illegal Provisions: Whatever item in this Agreement is found to be contrary to any local, state or 
federal law shall be considered null and void, just as if it had never appeared in this Agreement, and it shall 
not affect the validity of any other item in the Agreement 
53. Non-Waiver: Should either Owners or Tenant/Buyer waive their rights to enforce any breach of this 
Agreement, that waiver shall be considered temporary and not a continuing waiver of any later breach. 
.Although Owners may know when accepting rent that Tenant/Buyers are violating one or more of this 
Agreement's conditions, Owners in accepting the rent, are in no way waiving their rights to enforce the 
breach. Neither Owners nor Tenant/Buyer shall have waived their rights to enforce any breach unless they 
agree to a waiver in writing. 
54. References in Wording: Plural references made to the parties involved in this Agreement may also be 
singular, and single references may be plural These references may also apply to Owners' and 
Tenant/Buyers' heirs, executors, administrators, or successors, as the case may be. 
55. Entire Agreement: As written, this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the 
. Tenant/Buyer and Owners. They have made no further promises of any kind to one another, nor have they 
reached any other understandings, either written or verbal. 
56. Attorney's Fees: If either party to this Agreement shall bring a cause of action against the other party 
• for enforcement of the Agreement, the prevailing party shall recover reasonable attorney's fees involved. 
57. Binding Agreement: The parties to this agreement do hereby agree that this Lease Purchase 
, Agreement comprises the entire agreement and shall be binding upon the parties, their heirs, executors, 
. administrators, personal representatives, successors and or negligence. 
58 Preparer's Disclaimer: All of the undersigned parties in this agreement agree not to hold the prepare of 
.this document liable for any errors, omissions, mistakes or negligence. 
59 Modification: Any modification of any portion of this agreement must be made in writing and signed 
by both parties. . * ^ 
60. Financial Disclaimer: The parties to this Agreement acknowledge that speculation of availability of 
financing or assumption of existing loans towards the purchase of the above property is impossible to 
predict Therefore the parties agree that these items shall not be a condition of performance of this 
agreement and the parties agree they have not relied upon any representation or warranties by the 
Landlord/Seller or other parties. 
Initial <2t£^jQL 
6/pJL7/r2GK38 ±X : 5 5 : 2fc®12:> 
RESIDENTIAL LEASE PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
61. Acknowledgment: The undersigned Tenant/Buyer hereby acknowledge that they have read this 
Agreement, understand it, agree to it and have been given a copy. They further have been advised to seek 
legal, tax and technical counsel concerning this contract prior to signing. 
62. Misc.: 
1- An escrow account will be established with Escrow Specialists and buyer / tenant agrees to pay up to 
S100.00 for set-up fees and $12.00 service fee. 
2. This agreement is contingent to assignment of the agreement to a qualified tenant / buyer 
3.. Steven Benjamin is a licensed, practicing real estate agent in the State of Utah. However, with respect to 
this agreement / transaction he is not acting as a Realtor, nor representing any of the parties involved. 
Additionally, he is working independently of Great American Realty. 
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